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Abstract 
This paper uses plant-level estimates of total factor productivity covering almost 40 years to 
examine what role, if any, productivity has played in the decline of output share and 
employment in British manufacturing. The results show that TFP growth in British 
manufacturing was negative between 1973 and 1982, marginally positive between 1982 and 
1994 and strongly positive between 1994 and 2012. Poor TFP performance therefore does 
not appear to be the main cause of the decline of UK manufacturing. Productivity growth 
decompositions show that, in the latter period, the largest contributions to TFP growth come 
from industries that are heavily involved in trade, industries with high levels of intangible 
assets and industries with skilled labour forces. 
 
JEL classification numbers - D22; D24; L6 
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1. Introduction 
Manufacturing in many developed countries has been in continued and steady decline, both 
in terms of share of GDP and employment, over the last four decades.1 However, the decline 
in both measures has been particularly steep in the UK (Moffat, 2013; Government Office for 
Science, 2013). Nevertheless, manufacturing still makes a disproportionate contribution to the 
UK economy: a recent report on manufacturing in the UK (Government Office for Science, 
2013) notes its relatively high productivity, its accounting for half of UK exports in 2010 
(despite only contributing 10% to gross value added), its greater propensity to undertake R&D 
and introduce innovations, the strength of its inter-industry linkages and its use of highly-
skilled labour. The importance of manufacturing is not new (see Kaldor, 1966; Harris, 1987), 
but recognition of it now underpins a commitment by the UK Government to halting its long-
run decline (BIS 2010, 2012b).2 
 
The aim of this paper is to consider whether the productivity performance of manufacturing 
has played a role in its long-run (relative) decline. Since productivity (and especially the 
productivity of both labour and capital inputs into the production process, i.e. total factor 
productivity, or TFP) is widely recognised as the key driver of long-run economic growth (e.g., 
                                                     
1 As will be shown later, manufacturing output in 2012 was 97% of the level achieved in 1973, and 16 percentage 
points lower than its peak in 2001. In terms of employment, only some 36% of the 7.3 million employed in 1973 
were employed in the sector in 2012 (peak post-war employment in manufacturing was close to 9 million in 
1966). 
2 In 2011, the Chancellor of the Exchequer called for a 'march of the makers' (Osborne, 2011) and this theme 
remained recurrent in post-2011 Budgets. 
3 
 
Krugman, 1997; Baumol, 1984; O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009; Van Reenen, 2013), it is 
important to understand the progress of TFP in all sectors of the economy. But since part of 
the decline in manufacturing has historically been linked to its poor productivity performance 
(e.g., O’Mahony, 1998; O’Mahony and de Boer, 2002), such an understanding is of particular 
relevance here. Therefore, in this paper, we use plant-level data from the Annual Business 
Survey (ABS), conducted by the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS), to provide a detailed 
review of the productivity performance of British manufacturing from 1973 to 2012. 
 
The next section describes the relative decline in manufacturing compared to other major 
economies and presents TFP estimates calculated using growth accounting methods applied 
to industry-level data. Section 3 discusses our preferred approach for estimating TFP for each 
manufacturing plant in the ABS. In Section 4, these estimates are used to decompose 
productivity growth to show whether productivity growth/decline over 1973-2012 was the 
result of within-plant increases in productivity or reallocations of output shares across plants. 
Section 5 attempts to explain some of the trends in TFP in 1994-2012 by showing which groups 
of plants have contributed most to productivity growth. Groups are defined by ownership, 
levels of industry outsourcing, ‘openness’ to trade, labour force composition, and intangible 
assets. The paper concludes with a summary and brief discussion of policy options. 
Figures 1 and 2 around here 
 
2. Manufacturing performance 
De-industrialisation in the UK (i.e., the decline of manufacturing’s share of total economy GDP) 
has occurred faster than in other major economies; Figure 1 shows that, in 1970, the sector 
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accounted for the second largest share of GDP among the countries considered, but by 2014 
it had experienced the largest relative decline (a 20 percentage points fall). However, Figure 2 
suggests that this was not due to poor TFP performance (based on the growth accounting 
approach) since TFP in UK manufacturing saw a steady rise over the 1973-2007 period (with a 
major setback following the Great Recession). Moreover, its performance was comparable to 
that in France and Germany and much better than Italy’s, although not as strong as in the USA. 
By contrast, British TFP growth in non-manufacturing was at best lack-lustre.3 
 
The above TFP results based on the growth accounting approach are useful but limited since 
there are problems both with the methods used to construct TFP and the use of industry-level 
data (cf. Caves, 1998; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008). Some of the methodological issues with 
the standard growth accounting approach are: the typical use of gross value-added rather 
than gross output measures of production (see Gandhi et al., 2012, for a discussion of the 
limitations of the GVA approach);4 the imposition of constant returns-to-scale; the assumption 
of perfect competition in factor and output markets (necessary since output elasticities are 
                                                     
3 The peak level of non-manufacturing TFP was only slightly higher in 2007 when compared to 1973, whereas in 
manufacturing it was 55 percentage points higher. Put another way, average TFP growth p.a. in non-
manufacturing 1973-2007 was less than 0.1% compared to 2.3% in manufacturing. 
4 See also Sudit and Finger (1981, p. 15) who discuss gross output versus value-added measures of the production 
function, referring particularly to the work of Diewert (1978) and Bruno (1978), both of whom were early 
proponents of a gross output approach. Diewert (op. cit., p.42) went as far as saying: “one is … led to wonder 
about how much of the “unexplained residual” in growth studies … is due to the unjustified use of a real value-
added framework”. 
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equated to factor input cost shares in total revenue); and the treatment of TFP as an 
unexplained residual.5 The use of aggregate data is problematic as, for example, micro-level 
empirical evidence consistently indicates that plants/firms are heterogeneous with respect to 
productivity and industry-level data typically over-estimate measures of the capital stock, 
since the capital of plants that cease production usually remains in the industry-level measure 
of the stock.6 Moreover, the use of aggregate data precludes an analysis of whether 
reallocations of output shares explain the evolution of aggregate TFP. It is therefore not 
possible to state whether the above trends are the result of the closure of low TFP plants (i.e. 
a selection effect), within-plant increases in TFP or a more efficient allocation of output shares 
among surviving plants. Such an analysis is provided in the next section. 
 
                                                     
5 That is, factors that shift plants towards the ‘best-practice’ current technological frontier, together with those 
that influence technological progress, are not explicitly included or modelled in the growth accounting approach. 
This leads to bias in the output-elasticities relating factor inputs to output, given there are ‘omitted variables’ in 
the growth-accounting equation. 
6 Note, the growth accounting approach has its own merits – it is a strong descriptive method and so is most 
useful when the objective is to measure the relative contributions of input growth and ‘other influences’ on 
output growth. It typically only requires data on real output, capital and labour, total revenue and the total cost 
of labour; no econometric estimation is needed; it is easy to construct and interpret; and the aggregate data 
sources used mean that factor inputs can often be adjusted for ‘quality’ (see O'Mahony and Timmer, 2009, for a 
discussion). 
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3. Plant-level estimates of TFP 
In this study, we use plant-level panel data for manufacturing covering 1973-2012. The basic 
approach is described in the earlier analysis of Harris and Moffat (2015a), that estimates TFP 
for each market-sector plant operating in Great Britain in 1997-2008, although certain 
variables, such as R&D spending and whether a UK-owned plant belonged to a multinational 
enterprise, are only available since 1997 and are therefore omitted here. Harris and Moffat 
(op. cit.) describe in detail the rationale for inclusion of the variables in the model, the data 
(and especially the use of plants- rather than firms as the unit of analysis) and the econometric 
methodology, and the reader is referred to the earlier article for detailed information. Below, 
only the core elements of the approach used are set out.7 
 
TFP is estimated by plant (i.e., local unit) for each year covering 1973-2012 for manufacturing 
sectors as defined using the 1980 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). The first step was 
estimation of Cobb-Douglas log-linear production functions for each 2-digit industry (with 
certain industries sub-divided into 3-digit groupings – see the online appendix for details) 
using a system-GMM approach to address the issues of endogeneity inherent to production 
function estimation:8 
                                                     
7 Further details about the variables included and the data are provided in an online appendix  
8 Estimators (such as Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) that purport to overcome these 
endogeneity issues are based on assumptions we believe are more restrictive than those implied by system-
GMM (Ackerberg et al., 2015). In particular, these estimators do not allow for fixed effects, which are important 
as empirical evidence shows that the distribution of productivity has both a large variance and is persistent over 
time (see, for instance, Bartelsman and Dhrymes, 1998; Martin, 2008). Note, like the Olley-Pakes approach, 
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(1) 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝐸𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑀𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝐾𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑒𝑖𝑡, 𝑚𝑖𝑡 and 𝑘𝑖𝑡 refer to the natural logarithms of real gross output, employment, 
intermediate inputs9 and capital stock in plant i in time t (i = 1,…, N; t=1,…T) respectively and 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of observed (proxy) variables determining TFP (as set out in Table A.1). In order 
to calculate TFP, equation (1) is estimated providing values of the elasticities of output with 
respect to factor inputs (𝛼𝐸, 𝛼𝑀, and 𝛼𝐾). Logged TFP can be calculated as the level of (logged) 
output that is not attributable to factor inputs– i.e., TFP is due to efficiency levels and technical 
progress:10 
(2) 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝐸𝑒𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑀𝑚𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝐾𝑘𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀?̂?𝑡 
However, Equation (2) is not a proper TFP index, because the measure of input growth 
(?̂?𝐸𝑒𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?𝑀𝑚𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?𝐾𝑘𝑖𝑡) does not satisfy axiom X5 (proportionality) in O’Donnell (2016), 
except in the case of constant returns-to-scale (as discussed below, we generally find non-
                                                     
system-GMM is used to overcome the bias that would arise from OLS estimation if firms make decisions on factor 
inputs based on the value of the TFP shock (error term), which is unobservable to the researcher. 
9 Intermediate inputs cover materials, fuels, semi- and finished-goods and (especially business) services used in 
the production of new goods and services. We are not estimating a gross valued-added function because we do 
not want to impose weak separability (capital and labour are separable from intermediate inputs in production) 
and thus homogeneity with respect to 𝛼𝑀 - see Gandhi et al. (2012) for a discussion. 
10 TFP here comprises those factors contained in X that influence efficiency and technological progress. It also 
comprises an error term (𝜀?̂?𝑡), which will pick up any measurement error, unobserved inputs (e.g., intangibles 
not captured by the R&D variable, the use of outsourcing, increased quality of labour inputs, etc.), and changes 
in the level of utilisation of factor inputs. 
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constant returns-to-scale prevailed when equation 1 is estimated). Proportionality is 
therefore restored by using a special case of the Färe-Primont (1995) input index: 
(2a) 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝐹𝑃 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 −
1
?̂?𝐸+?̂?𝑀+?̂?𝐾
(?̂?𝐸𝑒𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?𝑀𝑚𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?𝐾𝑘𝑖𝑡) 
The data used to estimate equation (1), as described in Table A.1, comprise plant level data 
from the Annual Business Survey (ABS, formerly the Annual Respondents’ Database), which 
has been extensively discussed by previous users (see especially, Harris and Moffat, 2015a; 
Harris, 2005b; but also Oulton, 1997; Harris, 2002; and Griffith, 1999). Estimates of plant level 
capital stock are obtained using the perpetual inventory approach and plant level estimates 
of real investment; the methods used are set out in Harris and Drinkwater (2000) and Harris 
(2005a). Due to the stratified sampling frame of the ABS being biased towards larger plants, 
all data are weighted to be representative of the population of plants. 
Table 1 around here 
Average estimates for the output elasticities used to predict TFP are provided in Table 1 (the 
actual values are available in the online appendix, Tables U.1-U.4, which shows that the 
estimates for all 25 models estimated are economically sensible - overall returns-to-scale 
across manufacturing equal 1.1511 - and the models pass tests of the validity of the 
instruments12 and of autocorrelation). While the parameter estimates associated with 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in 
                                                     
11 Table 7 in Harris and Moffat (2015a) shows that this result is consistent with most recent studies. 
12 Output (y, including lagged output in the dynamic model), factor inputs (e, m and k) and brownfield foreign-
ownership are treated as endogenous. In all cases endogenous variables are instrumented by their lagged values 
(in first differences for the levels equation and levels for the first differenced equation). The validity of the 
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equation (1) are not the major focus of this paper, a brief commentary on the results obtained 
is warranted. Foreign-owned plants generally have higher TFP in high- and medium high-tech 
manufacturing but lower TFP in medium low- and low-tech manufacturing. Technical change 
was highest in high- and medium-low tech manufacturing. In terms of spatial variables, the 
results suggest agglomeration (diversification) is associated with lower (higher) TFP, but there 
is significant variation across the different sub-groups. The results for being located in an 
assisted area are mostly not significant. In contrast, city effects are generally positive and 
there are a number of large negative values associated with particular regions relative to the 
South East region (see Harris and Moffat, 2012, for further evidence on city and region 
effects). Older plants are uniformly less productive. Single-plant enterprises, and plants 
belonging to multi-industry enterprises, tend to have lower TFP and those belonging to 
enterprises operating in more than one region have higher productivity. Table 2 also includes 
the parameter estimates for three ‘recession’ dummy variables. Generally, TFP experienced a 
large, negative shock during the 1980-82 recession, a smaller negative effect in 1990-92, but 
a large positive shock post-2007 (especially in low-tech manufacturing). 
Figure 3 around here 
Figure 3 plots aggregate labour productivity and TFP in manufacturing obtained using 
Equation (2a) for 1973-2012. Comparison of Figures 2 and 313 shows that the growth 
accounting measure of TFP is less cyclically sensitive (to the early recessions), has sustained 
                                                     
instruments is assessed using the Hansen test of over-identification. In all 25 industries, the null of valid 
instruments is not rejected at the 10% level. 
13 Figure U.1 in the online appendix jointly plots the TFP indices reported in Figures 2 and 3, to allow comparison. 
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growth in TFP between 1981 and 1994, and shows a major dip post-2007. The finding that 
manufacturing productivity did not experience a large fall in the latter period is consistent 
with recent evidence from micro-data that the UK’s poor aggregate TFP performance since 
the Great Recession was entirely a service sector phenomenon (Harris and Moffat, 2016; Field 
and Franklin, 2013).14 However, the correlation between both series is 0.96 indicating that 
both follow similar time-paths. This again suggests that TFP performance did not play a major 
role in the relative decline of UK manufacturing. 
 
Three sub-periods for TFP are suggested by Figure 3 covering decline between 1973 and 1982, 
recovery from 1982 until 1994, and substantial improvement post-1994. In contrast, labour 
productivity increased throughout the period, reflecting in part the continued substitution of 
capital and intermediate inputs for labour at a time when manufacturing output was largely 
unchanged.15 
 
4. Productivity growth decompositions 
Having obtained an index of TFP at the plant-level, this section considers the sources of 
productivity growth over the three sub-periods identified in Figure 3. Then in Section V we 
focus on 1994-2012, and consider the contribution of different sub-groups of plants in an 
                                                     
14 Like others, Harris and Moffat (op. cit.) show that labour productivity fell sharply in manufacturing post-2008, 
but this was not due to a fall in TFP (rather changes to factor mix).  
15 Figure U.1 in the online appendix also plots the index of real gross output shown in Figure 3 and the ONS’s 
index of manufacturing production; both series are broadly similar with a correlation of 0.9. 
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attempt to explain the rapid productivity growth in this period. Individual plant-level TFP is 
aggregated as follows: 
(3) ln 𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑡 = ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑡 ln 𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑖𝑡𝑖  
𝜃𝑖𝑡 is the share of (real) gross output for plant 𝑖 in at time 𝑡. The growth of aggregate TFP is 
therefore given by: 
(4) ∆ ln 𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑡 = ln 𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑡 − ln 𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑡−𝑘 
Following Foster et al. (2001), TFP can be decomposed into five components as follows: 
(5) ∆ ln 𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑡 = ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑡−𝑘∆ ln 𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑖𝑡𝑖∈𝑆  
  + ∑ ∆𝜃𝑖𝑡(ln 𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑖𝑡−𝑘 − ln 𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑡−𝑘)𝑖∈𝑆 + ∑ ∆𝜃𝑖𝑡(∆ ln 𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑖𝑡)𝑖∈𝑆   
  + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑡(ln 𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑖𝑡 − ln 𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑡−𝑘)𝑖∈𝐸 − ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑡−𝑘(ln 𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑖𝑡−𝑘 − ln 𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑡−𝑘)𝑖∈𝑋  
The first component shows the contribution from improvements in TFP within plants that 
survived from 𝑡 − 𝑘 to 𝑡 (denoted by 𝑆), the second term shows the contribution from 
reallocations of output shares between plants that were open in 𝑡 − 𝑘 and 𝑡 and the third 
term shows the contribution from the coincidence of increases in productivity and increases 
in output shares in plants open in 𝑡 − 𝑘 to 𝑡. The final two terms capture the contribution from 
plants that entered between 𝑡 − 𝑘 and 𝑡 (denoted 𝐸) and plants that exited between 𝑡 − 𝑘 
and 𝑡 (denoted by 𝑋). If the observed growth in TFP is the result of the closure of low 
productivity plants, this term should be positive. 
 
As discussed by Melitz and Polanec (2015), a weakness of this approach is that the 
contribution of entrants will be overstated (and the contribution of survivors understated) if 
there is productivity growth between 𝑡 − 𝑘 and 𝑡 among survivors because the contribution 
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of entrants is calculated relative to that of all plants at 𝑡 − 𝑘. A plant that opens at 𝑡 (or any 
time after 𝑡 − 𝑘), that has lower productivity than surviving plants at time 𝑡, need only have 
higher productivity than the weighted average of productivity at time 𝑡 − 𝑘 in order to 
contribute positively to the entrants’ term. 
 
They therefore suggest an alternative decomposition method, based on the static 
decomposition of Olley and Pakes (1996), that does not have this feature: 
(6) ∆ ln 𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑡 =
1
𝑛𝑡
∑ ∆ ln 𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑖𝑡𝑖∈𝑆  
+∆ ∑(𝜃𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡)(ln 𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑖𝑡 − ln 𝑇𝐹𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡) 
+ ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑡 (∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑡
𝐸
𝑖∈𝐸
ln 𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑖𝑡 − ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑡
𝑆
𝑖∈𝑆
ln 𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑖𝑡)
𝑖∈𝐸
 
− ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑡−𝑘 (∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑡
𝑋
𝑖∈𝑋
ln 𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑖𝑡−𝑘 − ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑡
𝑆
𝑖∈𝑆
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑖𝑡−𝑘)
𝑖∈𝑋
 
where 𝑛𝑡 is the number of plants in manufacturing. The first term is the change in the 
unweighted mean of plant TFP among surviving plants between 𝑡 − 𝑘 and 𝑡. The second term 
is the change in the covariance between output shares and TFP among surviving plants. A 
positive value of this term therefore indicates reallocations of output shares towards more 
productive surviving plants. The third term is the difference in weighted TFP between entrants 
and survivors at time 𝑡. This differs from the approach of Foster et al. (2001) for whom the 
entrants term is calculated relative to the weighted average of productivity across all plants 
at 𝑡 − 𝑘. The final ‘exiters’ term is measured relative to the weighted average of survivors’ TFP 
at 𝑡 − 𝑘. 
Tables 2 and 3 around here 
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Tables 2 and 3 shows that over 1973-2012 aggregate TFP increased by 0.68% per annum (p.a.) 
and that this was almost entirely due to the contribution of plants that entered. In the first 
sub-period, 1973-82, TFP declined by 1.1% p.a. on average. This was largely the result of a 
negative contribution from falls in TFP within plants, offset to some extent by reallocations of 
output share in surviving plants towards more productive plants. TFP recovered between 1982 
and 1994, increasing by 0.9% p.a. Entrants were mainly responsible for this better 
performance through their contribution of 1.1% p.a. over the period, which was sufficient to 
offset the negative contribution from within plant deteriorations in productivity and the 
closure of relatively productive plants. In contrast, TFP increased by 1.5% p.a. on average 
between 1994 and 2012. The primary source of this increase differs according to the 
decomposition method used: the Foster et al. (2001) approach attributes 1.1% p.a. to entrants 
and 0.5% p.a. to reallocations of output shares across surviving plants. By contrast, the Melitz 
and Polanec (2015) approach attributes 1.3% p.a. to a higher covariance between output 
shares and productivity among surviving plants and only 0.5% to entrants. As discussed above, 
this is the pattern that would be expected since there was productivity growth among 
survivors in 1994-2012. 
 
Table 2 also shows that in 1973-1982 and 1982-1994, TFP growth was lowered by the negative 
contribution of the closure or more productive plants. In 1994-2012, regardless of the 
decomposition method used, exiting plants made a positive but small contribution to 
productivity growth. The finding that TFP in manufacturing has increased over the last forty 
years is therefore not primarily due to the closure of low productivity plants. 
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5. Sources of productivity growth post-1994 
Studies that have analysed the evolution of UK manufacturing productivity until the end of 
the 1980s (for example, Cameron, 2003) tended to concentrate on the structural changes that 
were taking place during this period. According to Cameron (2003, p. 122), “In the 1970s … 
institutional rigidities, strong trade unions, lax competition policies, corporatist government 
interventions and a slowdown in technological advance led to a growth slowdown.…Growth 
rose in the 1980s because of the weakening of trade union power, withdrawal of state 
subsidies, the shedding of below average labour and capital, increasing subcontracting, the 
widespread adoption of ‘microchip’ technologies.”16 17 
 
                                                     
16 Cameron himself explained the higher productivity growth of the 1980s as being due to large and significant 
returns to business R&D, to decreasing unionisation, and to an increase in white-collar employment vis-a-vis 
manual employment. 
17 While it is generally accepted that unions in the 1970s were a drag on productivity (Metcalf, 2003), leading to 
productivity gains in the 1980s (Cameron, 2003; Bryson et al., 2005), Van Reenen (2013) argues that it "seems 
improbable that antiunion laws would have a permanent effect on productivity growth. Unions would have to of 
have a seriously negative effect on innovation and there is no compelling evidence of this" (page 127). 
Doucouliagos and Laroche (2003) conclude "that if all the available evidence is pooled together, measures of 
central tendency indicate a near zero association between unions and productivity … (although) a negative 
association appears for the United Kingdom and Japan" (page 682). Figure 4 below shows that in manufacturing 
most of the decline in unionisation had occurred by 1990, such that unionism per se had a negligible impact on 
productivity by the late 1990s (Pencavel, 2003; Bryson and Forth, 2010; Wright and Brown, 2014). Further falls 
after this period were against a backdrop of much lower unionisation, with trade union density below 19% in 
2012. 
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In order to explain high productivity growth in 1994-2012, we consider the role of 
globalisation, the composition of the workforce and intangible assets. In relation to the 
former, the continued opening up of the UK economy is likely to have played a role in raising 
manufacturing TFP in 1994-2012. As Griffith et al. (2005) note: “deregulation and the opening 
of markets to international trade and investment has been widely recognised as a major driver 
of growth… (The) main effects of liberalisation … (are) the replacement of low productivity 
plants with high productivity entrants… increased competition or entry (inducing) incumbent 
firms to organise work more effectively, (while) the contribution of… multinationals to 
domestic productivity growth (advances) the U.K.’s technological frontier” (Griffith, op cit, 
pages 2-3). We consider three dimensions of globalisation: trade, foreign direct investment 
and offshoring. There is evidence for the UK that foreign-owned firms have higher productivity 
(Girma et al., 2001; Harris and Robinson, 2003; Harris and Moffat, 2015a). Similarly, many 
studies have found that involvement in trade increases productivity (see Wagner, 2012, for a 
review of the recent evidence and Harris and Moffat, 2015b for a recent study on the UK). 
Alongside the opening of markets has been increased material and service outsourcing, and 
especially offshoring, in manufacturing worldwide, which a number of studies have found 
increases productivity (e.g. Amiti and Wei, 2009). The latter can arise for a number of reasons: 
static efficiency gains as firms focus on core competencies and offshore less productive 
activities; interaction with foreign suppliers, which can enhance learning externalities; the 
higher quality or better fit of imported input varieties; and general equilibrium effects if 
productivity gains spill over to other firms or induce tougher competition (cf. Criscuolo and 
Leaver, 2005; Schwörer, 2013; Fariñas et al., 2011). 
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A second major source of productivity gains since 1994 is likely to have been an up-skilling of 
the workforce employed in manufacturing. Raising the quality of labour input has a direct 
effect on productivity, which has been demonstrated in a large number of studies (e.g. Sianesi 
and Van Reenen, 2003; Bosworth et al., 2008; Oesch and Menés, 2011; Madsen, 2013). If 
higher human capital causes innovation, this will strengthen the impact of human capital on 
TFP (e.g. Gennaioli et al., 2013). In recent decades the evidence for affluent countries is that 
high skill occupations have been expanding at the expense of low skilled ones, and this is 
especially true in Britain (Felstead et al., 2007). This can be explained by growth in 
manufacturing imports from newly industrialising economies, skill-biased technical change 
associated with a growth in ICT and the demise of collective-bargaining for unskilled workers 
(Peng and Kang, 2013).18 Empirical evidence from Gregory et al. (2001) shows that over the 
period 1979–90 in the UK, technological change had a major influence on the relative demand 
for skills, while the effect of trade was relatively small. 
 
Lastly, intangible assets (which can be defined as complimentary knowledge embodied in 
intellectual assets and thus comprise more than just formal R&D19) are widely recognised as a 
                                                     
18 Peng and Kang (op sit) are arguing that collective bargaining power is a decisive factor in accounting for 
disparities in skill premiums; given the way labour composition is measured, weighting employment in 
occupational groups by the associated wage for that group, this will have an impact. 
19 In concrete terms, intangible assets have been classified by some “… into economic competencies (i.e., invest 
in skills, advertising and branding and organizational structure), scientific and creative property (i.e., R&D and 
‘innovation’ more generally) and Information and Communications Technology” (BIS, 2012a; emphasis in 
original). 
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key driver of enterprise performance and thus productivity (e.g., Corrado et al., 2006, 2012; 
Van Ark et al., 2009; Dal Borgo et al., 2013) especially by proponents of a ‘resource-based’ 
perspective of the firm (e.g., Penrose, 1959; Barney, 1991; Kogut and Zander, 1996; Teece et 
al., 1998; Harris and Moffat, 2013b). Their increased usage may also have played a role in 
increasing TFP growth. 
Figure 4 around here 
Figure 4 presents the available information for UK manufacturing on changes in the (real) 
‘openness’ of the sector, the composition of employment, trade union density and the relative 
importance of intangible (to tangible) investment for 1973-2007. ‘Openness’ (the ratio of 
exports and imports to GVA) was increasing in the 1970s, accelerated after the 1980-82 
recession, and continued to grow post-1994. A similar pattern is shown for labour 
composition, with the largest increase occurring post-1994. As discussed in footnote 23, 
unionisation in manufacturing had seen the largest decline in the 1980s, followed by 
continued decline after 1992. Lastly, Figure 4 indicates the very rapid growth in intangible 
asset building that occurred after 1997 (information is not available before this date). Thus 
the estimates of plant level TFP obtained in this study have been grouped into sub-categories 
reflecting high-to-low levels of change in openness, offshoring, labour composition, and total 
innovation spending (the latter proxying for investments in intangible assets) in order to show 
whether industries most involved in these activities did indeed contribute more to 
productivity growth.20 
                                                     
20 Details are provided in the online appendix (Tables U.5 – U.9) on how industries were categorised into sub-
groups experiencing high-to-low levels of change. 
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Table 3 presents the results from decomposing TFP growth using the Melitz and Polanec 
(2015) approach for 1994-2012 by ownership sub-groups and by industries with differing 
levels of trade, offshoring, labour force composition and intangible assets. The ownership 
classification is done at the plant-level since the ABS contains the necessary information at the 
plant-level on ownership status. However, the other classifications are done at the industry 
level, as the ABS does not include the required variables measuring exporting/importing, 
offshoring, labour composition or intangible assets at the plant level. Plants are therefore 
allocated using their SIC code to industries with high, medium-high, medium-low and low 
levels of the relevant activity, with the classification of industries based on data from outside 
sources (see the online appendix for details). This therefore creates the likelihood that some 
plants are misclassified (for example, a plant that does no exporting or importing will be 
included in the high level of openness group if all other plants in its industry are heavily 
involved in trade) but, in our view, this represents the best possible approach with the data at 
our disposal. 
 
The first three decompositions are intended to measure different dimensions of globalisation. 
In relation to ownership, disproportionately large contributions came from the foreign-owned 
sub-groups, largely due to reallocations of output shares towards relatively productive plants. 
Foreign-owned plants have therefore played an important role in productivity growth in 1994-
2012. The industries most 'open' to international trade contributed the most to TFP growth, 
largely due to reallocations of output shares towards more productive surviving plants. While 
the first two panels suggest increased globalisation has had an important role in driving 
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productivity growth in 1994-2012, industries involved in offshoring have tended to contribute 
less to aggregate TFP growth, vis-à-vis those with low levels of offshoring. Interestingly, one 
of the reasons for the relatively poor performance of the industries most involved in 
offshoring was a tendency to close relatively productive plants. This shows that, while 
offshoring may have reduced costs and boosted profits, the plants that closed were not 
necessarily unproductive. 
Table 4 around here 
Industries with more highly paid labour forces made a significant contribution to aggregate 
productivity growth (0.6% p.a.), mostly due to the entry of relatively productive plants and 
exit of less productive plants. However, industries belonging to the low-level sub-group 
provided the largest contribution, indicating the relationship between highly skilled labour 
forces and TFP growth is not as clear-cut as that between openness and TFP growth. The final 
panel of Figure 3 shows that, as expected, industries with the highest level of intangible assets 
had the fastest TFP growth in 1994-2012, again because of reallocations of output share to 
more productive plants. 
 
6. Conclusion 
As is acknowledged by the UK government, the manufacturing sector makes a far larger 
contribution to the UK economy (to exports, innovation, other sectors through inter-industry 
linkages and the employment of highly skilled labour) than would be expected given its output 
share. This paper has calculated estimates of TFP for all manufacturing plants in the ABS 
between 1973 and 2012 to see what role, if any, TFP may have played in manufacturing’s 
continuing relative decline. These show that TFP fell between 1973 and 1982 but had 
20 
 
recovered by 1994. Since this date, TFP has increased rapidly. Only a small proportion of the 
growth since 1994 can be explained by a selection effect, whereby low productivity plants 
exited the market. The continued relative decline of UK manufacturing cannot therefore be 
attributed to poor TFP performance. Aggregate TFP growth was then decomposed to show 
the contribution of different sectors. This showed that much of the growth in this latter period 
comes from foreign-owned plants, industries that are involved in trade and industries with 
high levels of intangible assets. 
 
Since the UK government is committed to increasing the role of manufacturing in the 
economy, it is useful to discuss the policy implications of our results. Firstly, the results support 
efforts to encourage activities that allow firms to build up intangible assets. R&D tax credits, 
which have operated in the UK since 2000, are an example of such a policy although a recent 
meta-analysis finds these have been less effective in manufacturing than services (Castellacci 
and Mee Lie, 2015). Similarly, the results support assistance such as that offered by UK Trade 
and Investment to increase exporting, particularly since previous research using micro-data 
has found that such policies can be effective (Gorg et al., 2008; Van Biesebrock et al., 2016). 
We also find that the industries that are most involved in offshoring contribute positively to 
productivity growth but to a relatively small extent due to the closure of productive plants. 
This suggests that these firms are moving capacity in order to lower costs, rather than to 
increase productivity. Whether slowing the rate of offshoring is feasible, given the UK’s high 
wage costs, is debatable but recent reductions in the main rate of UK corporation tax (from 
28% to 20% between 2008 and 2015, declining to 19% in 2017) may help at the margin. Such 
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a policy may also attract foreign-owned plants that were also shown to have contributed 
positively to productivity growth. 
 
More broadly, we confirm the results of earlier papers (Disney et al., 2003; Harris and Moffat, 
2013a) which emphasise the importance of reallocations of output shares both among 
surviving plants and most especially the opening of new plants as a source of productivity 
growth. Policy measures to increase competition and thus facilitate the transfer of resources 
between firms would therefore improve aggregate productivity. By contrast, the government 
should resist pressures to support unproductive plants in areas where resources are likely to 
be reemployed quickly, since this will impede the process of ‘creative destruction’ necessary 
to generate productivity growth. 
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TABLE 1 
Estimated long-run parameters* from estimating equation (1), by sector, Great Britain 1973-
2012 
 
High-
tech 
Medium 
high-
tech 
Medium 
low-tech 
Low-tech 
All 
sectors 
ln Intermediate Inputs 0.601 0.639 0.559 0.660 0.624 
ln Employment 0.330 0.284 0.386 0.346 0.336 
ln Capital 0.204 0.193 0.148 0.204 0.188 
Time 0.015 0.005 0.012 0.009 0.009 
ln Age -0.283 -0.267 -0.237 -0.316 -0.280 
Single-Plant Enterprise -0.031 0.000 -0.007 -0.125 -0.052 
Multi-Industry Enterprise -0.098 -0.012 -0.050 -0.007 -0.028 
Multi-Region Enterprise 0.041 0.000 0.051 0.020 0.024 
Greenfield US-Owned 0.088 0.121 0.076 0.021 0.069 
Brownfield US-Owned 0.000 0.072 -0.016 -0.158 -0.043 
Greenfield EU-Owned 0.000 0.095 -0.047 -0.027 0.006 
Brownfield EU-Owned 0.018 0.073 0.017 -0.008 0.023 
Greenfield Other Foreign-
Owned 
0.000 0.081 -0.023 -0.062 -0.006 
Brownfield Other Foreign-
Owned 
-0.163 0.136 -0.228 -0.174 -0.098 
ln Agglomeration -0.010 -0.003 0.031 -0.025 -0.004 
ln Diversification -0.013 0.059 -0.020 0.048 0.028 
ln Herfindahl Index -0.044 -0.039 -0.004 0.024 -0.008 
Assisted Area 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.013 0.007 
Main Cities 0.041 0.000 0.028 0.034 0.024 
North-East 0.036 -0.018 -0.021 -0.096 -0.042 
Yorkshire-Humberside 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.063 -0.023 
North-West 0.018 0.005 0.032 0.107 0.051 
West Midlands 0.010 -0.023 -0.014 -0.049 -0.027 
East Midlands 0.039 -0.017 -0.011 -0.083 -0.034 
South-West 0.023 0.010 -0.032 -0.016 -0.008 
East 0.000 0.000 -0.024 -0.083 -0.037 
London 0.000 -0.017 -0.064 -0.055 -0.040 
Scotland 0.004 -0.019 -0.051 -0.031 -0.028 
Wales 0.027 -0.041 -0.019 -0.048 -0.031 
Dummy 1980-82 -0.021 -0.081 -0.075 -0.036 -0.056 
Dummy 1990-92 -0.034 -0.015 -0.026 -0.013 -0.019 
Dummy 2008-12 0.122 0.098 0.031 0.225 0.133 
* Weighted averages based on parameter estimates in Tables U.1 – U.4 in online appendix (?̂? 
with p-values < 0.1 are set to zero; weighted by average real gross output in each industry, 
1973-2012). 
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TABLE 2 
Foster et al. (2001) productivity growth decomposition, 1973-2012, by sub-period 
  Total Survivors Entrants Exiters   
Within plant Between plant† 
  
1973-2012 0.68 -0.03 0.09 0.62 -0.01 
1973-1982 -1.14 -2.67 1.30 0.27 -0.04 
1982-1994 0.89 -0.31 0.48 0.81 -0.09 
1994-2012 1.46 -0.06 0.45 1.06 0.01 
† The second and third terms on the right-hand-side of the equal sign in equation (5) are combined. 
 
TABLE 3 
Melitz and Polanec (2015) productivity growth decomposition, 1973-2012, by sub-period 
  Total Survivors Entrants Exiters   
Within plant Between plant† 
  
1973-2012 0.68 -0.27 0.58 0.44 -0.07 
1973-1982 -1.14 -1.96 0.33 0.53 -0.05 
1982-1994 0.89 -0.03 0.30 0.77 -0.15 
1994-2012 1.46 -0.48 1.34 0.54 0.06 
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TABLE 4 
Melitz and Polanec (2015) productivity growth decomposition, 1994-2012, by other factors 
  Total Survivors Entrants Exiters Output share 
Foreign-owned  Within plant Between plant†   1994 2012 
UK-owned 0.30 0.06 -0.02 0.21 0.04 68.50 39.19 
US-owned 0.21 -0.15 0.19 0.19 -0.01 15.52 20.29 
EU-owned 0.27 -0.15 0.29 0.10 0.03 11.75 23.58 
Other foreign-owned 0.68 -0.25 0.88 0.04 0.00 4.23 16.94 
Openness        
High-level 1.13 0.07 0.71 0.30 0.06 15.09 22.95 
Medium high-level 0.29 -0.03 0.13 0.26 -0.07 43.66 39.75 
Medium low-level 0.22 -0.01 0.09 0.07 0.07 25.58 25.51 
Low-level -0.18 -0.51 0.41 -0.08 0.00 15.68 11.79 
Offshoring               
High-level 0.08 0.04 -0.04 0.11 -0.03 17.91 12.67 
Medium high-level -0.08 -0.36 0.08 -0.05 0.25 37.15 30.07 
Medium low-level 0.24 -0.14 0.47 0.16 -0.24 25.02 26.32 
Low-level 1.22 -0.02 0.83 0.33 0.08 19.93 30.95 
Labour Composition        
High-level 0.61 0.18 0.00 0.19 0.24 27.64 21.65 
Medium high-level -0.09 -0.06 0.06 0.14 -0.23 22.73 19.20 
Medium low-level 0.20 -0.57 0.54 -0.04 0.27 20.66 23.02 
Low-level 0.73 -0.03 0.73 0.26 -0.22 28.97 36.13 
Intangible Assets        
High-level 1.60 0.20 0.87 0.31 0.22 32.91 42.81 
Medium high-level 0.28 -0.08 0.19 0.16 0.01 25.80 23.88 
Medium low-level 0.06 -0.52 0.45 -0.05 0.17 17.22 13.29 
Low-level -0.48 -0.09 -0.17 0.12 -0.33 24.07 20.02 
All 1.46 -0.48 1.34 0.54 0.06 100.00 100.00 
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Figure 1. Manufacturing percentage share of GDP, 1970-2014* 
 
* Numbers on right-hand-side are percentage point change in share 1970 to 2014 
Source: OECD (STAN) database 
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Figure 2: Manufacturing TFP index (growth accounting approach), 1973-2009 (1997 = 1) 
 
Source: EUKLEMS 
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Figure 3. Manufacturing TFP, labour productivity, Real Gross Output and Employment Indices, 1973-2012* (1973 = 1) 
 
* 𝐿𝑃𝑡 =
∑ ln 𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡×𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑖
 ; 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡 =
∑ ln 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡×𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑖
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑖
, where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 (𝑒𝑖𝑡) is weighted real gross output (employment) in plant 𝑖 at time 𝑡. The figures for 1997, 
2001 and 2004 are interpolated since these years show large and unsustained jumps or falls in one or more of the series. These are likely due to 
inconsistencies in the data compilation methods. 
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Figure 4. Factors affecting productivity 1973-2007 in UK manufacturing (1997 = 1) 
 
Source: Real openness (PWT v8.1: csh_x+csh_m; see Feenstra et al., 2013); labour composition (EUKLEMS; LAB_QI/H_EMP); trade union density 
(UK Labour Force Survey 1989, 1995-2007; Price and Bain, 1983, for data for 1973 and 1978; other years – shown by dashes – are interpolated 
using OECD figures for all UK sectors); intangibles to tangibles ratio (Borgo et al., 2013; Table 3). 
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TABLE A1 
Definitions of variables and (weighted) mean values for 1973 and 2012 
Variable Definition 
Real Gross Output 
Plant level gross output data deflated by ONS producer 
price (output) indices (£m 2000 prices) 
Real Intermediate Inputs 
Plant level intermediate inputs (gross output minus GVA) 
deflated by ONS producer price (input) indices (£m 2000 
prices) 
Capital 
Plant and machinery capital stock (£m 1995 prices) plus 
real value of hires (deflated by PPI index) in plant. Source 
Harris and Drinkwater (2000, updated) 
Employment Number employed in plant 
Age Number of years since year of opening 
Single Plant Enterprise Dummy coded 1 if plant comprises a single-plant enterprise 
Multi-Industry Enterprise 
Dummy coded 1 if enterprise has more than one 4-digit 
SIC80 across plants it owns 
Multi-Region Enterprise 
Dummy coded 1 if plant belongs to an enterprise operating 
plants in more than one UK region 
Greenfield US-Owned 
Dummy coded 1 if plant is US-owned and newly opened 
1973-2012 
Brownfield US-Owned 
Dummy coded 1 if plant is US-owned and not newly 
opened 1973-2012 
Greenfield EU-Owned 
Dummy coded 1 if plant is EU-owned and newly opened 
1973-2012 
Brownfield EU-Owned 
Dummy coded 1 if plant is EU-owned and not newly 
opened 1973-2012 
Greenfield Other Foreign-
Owned 
Dummy coded 1 if plant is other foreign-owned and newly 
opened 1973-2012 
Brownfield Other Foreign-
Owned 
Dummy coded 1 if plant is other foreign-owned and not 
newly opened 1973-2012 
Industry Agglomeration 
Percentage of industry real gross output (at 4-digit SIC 
level) located in each local authority (LA) in which plant is 
located (MAR externalities) 
Diversification 
Proportion of the 206 4-digit SIC80 industries in each LA in 
which plant is located - Jacobian spillovers 
Herfindahl Index Herfindahl index of UK industry concentration (3-digit level) 
Assisted Area 
Dummy coded 1 if plant if plant is located in a government-
defined assisted area 
Region 
Dummies coded 1 if plant is located in a particular 
government office region 
Main Cities* 
Dummy coded 1 if plant if plant is located in major city 
(defined by NUTS3 code) 
* These are London, Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Cardiff, Tyneside, 
Liverpool, Bristol, Nottingham, Leicester and Coventry. 
